Introduction
The literature on transitions to democracy is very large and can count both on theoretical works and a number of case-studies that can be drawn upon to understand one of the most relevant political events in the life of any country: regime change. In theoretical terms, the literature has seen the emergence of interpretative schools that highlight the main tenets of democratisation. 1 When it comes to case studies, processes of democratisation have been examined across continents, in diverse cultural contexts and with regard to different systems of authoritarian government. The vast majority of these studies have been carried out within the confines of comparative politics and according to
Grugel 'the home of democratisation studies has traditionally been comparative politics. ' 2 This means that, with some notable exceptions, the literature has suffered from a lack of engagement with international relations. The result has been a marginalisation of international variables as key explanatory factors in favour of domestic variables. This is also the case in the works of scholars who first introduced the international dimension such as Huntington 3 and Whitehead, 4 although the latter seems to have recently revised his position. Thus, the process and the outcome of a founding moment in the life of a country have been explained as if occurring in a vacuum.
More recently, there have been efforts made to deal with this gap and there have been calls to bridge comparative and international politics when examining regime change. 5 This paper follows this path and presents a theoretical discussion that includes international variables into the study of regime change and empirically examines the case of Morocco.
Before looking at the theoretical issues, it is necessary to highlight the reasons behind the choice of Morocco and tackle the methodological difficulties that exist when selecting only one case. There are three reasons why the choice of Morocco is valid. First of all, the comparative literature on transitions tended to neglect the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). For instance, in his wide-ranging study, Huntington did not mention the MENA at all in spite of the liberalising trends that the region experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. Secondly, Morocco saw its high hopes dashed and today it is assigned to the category of liberalised autocracies. These are countries 'tempering authoritarianism with pluralism' 6 and 'with their ultimate reliance on the supreme authority of the monarch or the president, [they] provide a kind of virtual democracy.' 7 Thus, explaining a failure can contribute to the understanding of the process of democratisation just as a successful case can. 8 Transitions to democracy can fail, or at least stagnate, and if international factors are part of the explanation, it is important to highlight their influence. Finally, Morocco can be considered a paradigmatic case in terms of the relationship that exists between political liberalisation, Islamic opposition and international acceptance of such movements. The rise of Islamist parties during transitions in the Arab world has important repercussions for the West-dominated international community both at policy-making and normative levels.
The selection of one case study to make general inferences about a theoretical framework is considered problematic. 9 This study accepts that there are important limitations to the examination of only one case, but the in-depth investigation of Morocco can highlight trends that can be generalised to other similar cases and there is today a substantial scholarship that defends a methodology based on a single case study.
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The International Dimension: a Framework of Analysis
For a long time, the study of transitions assumed that 'democratisation [was] a domestic affair par excellence.' 11 In summarising the spirit of the literature, Yilmaz noted: 'democratic transition has been one particular field of study in comparative politics where the dismissal of international factors has been more pronounced than in other fields.' 12 There are two fundamental reasons that explain why the domestic focus is so pronounced to the detriment of international variables.
On theoretical grounds, it is difficult to have a shared definition of what
constitutes the international context. Given these definitional difficulties, it is problematic to link international variables to domestic change, as there is no agreement to what the external environment actually is and how it might operate. This does not mean that the international context is not somehow incorporated in the analysis. Most scholars cannot ignore the external environment, but they treat it as having only a very marginal effect on the process of transition. Furthermore, the poor theoretical conception of the external environment leads inevitably to think of international variables in structural terms. This marginalises external active and specific policies that international actors may take and that may have an impact on transitions through their linkages with the domestic actors.
On practical grounds, it is particularly difficult to find the evidence that would point to a causal mechanism at work between international factors and domestic change.
The combined effect of theoretical and practical difficulties contributes to the unwillingness of transitology to engage with international variables.
In spite of such difficulties, it is becoming increasingly awkward to exclude international factors from the analysis of regime change. 13 A number of scholars attempted to incorporate the international context in their studies of democratisation, as it seems beyond doubt that major shifts in the distribution of power in the international system and global political and economic trends contributed to a number of democratisations. 14 However, they ultimately concluded that domestic factors still prevail when it comes to explaining the pattern of development of a transition. For the most part, scholars such as Whitehead and Pridham did not take on board definitions and theoretical tools from other traditions and remained faithful to the literature on comparative politics, which neatly separates external and internal factors. The impact of their attempts should not be dismissed, as it was the first step to encourage others to pursue the examination of the international dimension, but it should also be recognised that they do not conceive of the centrality of international factors.
Whitehead, for instance, argues that the external dimension has a 'limited' impact during the consolidation period, but not before then. For example, the role played by the European Union during the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek transitions is that of a 'facilitator of democracy' thanks to the carrot of membership that is on offer. In his analysis, the EU does not directly exercise policy-making influence on the domestic bargaining process between ruling and opposition elites, which characterises the development of transitions in a complex game to set up new political arrangements. For his part, Huntington argues that there are powerful international triggers to transitions, but then proceeds to explain the course of regime change only through the same domestic bargaining process. All this points in the direction of seemingly 'fixed' resources and 'objectives' that the domestic actors have when they play the 'game' of transition and excludes the possibility that external actors may actually modify such resources and objectives throughout the game itself therefore altering the outcome. Domestic actors react to 'domestic events' during a transition in order to improve their position, but just as they adapt to changed internal conditions, they may also be very aware that they need to adapt to external actions. At the same time, external actors can change their direct policies according to what the domestic 'game' generates in terms of political dynamics.
A rather more complex game involving both the external and the internal is a more plausible interpretative framework.
In addition, both Huntington and Whitehead make a very limited use of the 'international' and confine it to one specific phase of the process of transition (although they disagree on the phase to focus on), but the assumption could be made that if external factors have an impact, they do so during all the phases of the transition.
Crucially, a number of recent studies attempted to capture the centrality of the international dimension through the contamination of comparative politics with international relations. Yilmaz has put forth a prominent study developing an open model of democratic change. 15 Also, Gillepsie and Youngs focus their attention on the role played by the European Union in the Mediterranean 16 and Cavatorta examines the role of external variables in the failed democratisation of Algeria. 17 These studies attempt to look at transitions in a more encompassing manner and refuse to a large extent to assume that such important processes can take place in a virtual vacuum.
However, within this limited literature, it emerges a strong bias towards structural approaches. For instance, Hamanreh's approach to 'the global wave of political liberalisation' 18 affecting the region centres only on structural economics. In his explanation, it is the capitalist international system that drives domestic changes and in the late 1980s this meant that structural adjustment programs destined to introduce market oriented reforms were an agent of democratisation in the Arab world. While this is an important point, it fails to address the politics of the international system and through its structuralism makes transitions seem predetermined in terms of outcome. In such a model, there is very little room to manoeuvre for the domestic actors, as they are conceived as being completely at the mercy of externally generated constraints.
Yilmaz's contribution is possibly more effective, although still too 'structural.' It is a valuable attempt to make sense of the international dimension of transition to democracy through the use of international relations theory and through the connection between domestic actors and their external environment in terms of cost and benefit analysis for the actions they undertake and the strategies they pursue. In order to avoid such pitfalls, the international context should be defined according to a mix of structure and agency and could be conceived of three different types of pressure that countries experience. These are:
• Structural pressures generated at international level, which lead countries in the system to conform to specific political and economic requirements in order to fit into a West-dominated system.
• Ad hoc policies adopted by the leading nation-states in the system, which aim at influencing the domestic distribution of resources among actors to achieve their most preferred outcome in line with their national interest.
• External shocks that condition the domestic bargaining game. These shocks take place outside the country under examination and cannot be controlled by domestic actors.
In this framework of understanding, structuralism is tempered by both international and domestic agency because explanations of complex political phenomena are seldom 'mono-causal' and often see a dynamic relationship between agency and structure. This is also the crucial point where some concepts imported from the classic realist school of international relations could be useful and where the previous literature's emphasis on structuralism should be tempered with the introduction of the 'agency' of specific actors.
The acceptance of some realist concepts such as power and interest does not mean that the all theoretical claims realism makes should be taken on board, but it simply indicates that the recent excessive focus on liberalism (with its pro-democracy stances) and on normative foreign policies might be misplaced. States and other international actors still take action according to their interests and the effects these actions have are still dependent on power. For instance, policies aimed at exporting democracy are not primarily about the establishment of democracy per se, but about security. Democracy is not exported because of its inherent normative superiority to other political systems, but because it is seen as the best means to achieve stability and security. From this, it follows that the possibility of the emergence of a 'bad democracy' (i.e. an Islamist party in power through democratic procedures) is a threat to the pursuit of democracy and therefore such an outcome should be avoided, if possible, in favour of 'good authoritarianism.' This fits in quite well with the realist emphasis on attaining specific 'goals' for the benefit of one's state with the consequent marginalisation of moral behaviour.
The innovation of this framework of understanding rests on the introduction of two analytical dimensions, which countries should be categorised on. These dimensions 'frame' the three types of pressures outlined above. Regarding the first dimension, there is the position of a country in the international economic system. In this context, the contribution of those who highlight the relevance of structural approaches should be recognised, but, at the same time, the international economic system should be overestimated as an explanatory variable. Thus, the international economic dimension is a relevant tool of analysis because of the type of international pressure that can be applied by a range of actors (i.e. conditionality). In a highly interdependent economic system, it is very difficult for any country to be isolated from the global economy and be able to pursue policies in tension with mainstream economic wisdom without suffering consequences, but such mainstream vision is the product of the stronger actors in the system, who promote it to benefit from its implementation. This is in line with the precepts of classical realism, which postulates that leading countries will implement the policies that in the short-term ensure the pursuit of their 'interests' and guarantee their security. Once the economic position of a country is determined within the system and how changes there might affect the powerful states active in the region, it becomes clearer if it is more or less prone to feel changes at the international level. It is for this reason that any effective theoretical framework that wants to incorporate the international dimension has to identify the position of the country under examination in economic terms.
On the second dimension, there is the position of a country in the political international system. In this case as well, realism can become a contingent useful tool of analysis because it allows the ranking countries in terms of their relevance for the leading actors in the system. 21 Some nation-states are extremely important for their geo-strategic location and regime change in these states tends to have more relevant repercussions externally than if it were taking place in states at the margins of the system. It is for this actors, which in turn has an effect on how they will act. 23 Secondly, it is assumed that processes of regime change are mostly pathdependent and that therefore it is imperative to analyse actors and their actions informed by strategies and objectives. This does not mean that structural approaches are not useful, as they provide the necessary context within which such actions take place. The levels of socio-economic development or structural economic and political transformations play a certain role, but structural explanations run the risk of predetermining outcomes, which instead are largely dependent on decision-making. This is the reason why the focus is here on agency and less on structure and follows the line of inquiry suggested by Quandt in his work on Algeria. 24 Thirdly, it is fundamental to temper the realist assumption about the role of nation states and their centrality in international politics. While powerful states in particular remain the most important actors in the system, there are multiple international actors participating to the transition game and they influence domestic societies and actors at different levels and in different manners. It is therefore important to analyse the role that international financial institutions, multinationals and transnational bodies all play.
Finally, it is important to establish the normative value and meaning of democracy in the literature on transitions. This aspect deserves a longer discussion because it is a key element in understanding transitions in light of the international dimension. Far from being the essentially contested concept it is in political theory, democracy is a well-established model in transitology and, even more importantly, it is also an objective model for policy-makers. One of the main tenets of transitology is indeed the coincidence existing between democracy and the specific type of it that is western-style liberal democracy. This, not coincidentally, happens to be the mode of government of the most powerful states in the international system and the model preferred by international financial institutions. When a process of political liberalisation begins in any given country, the population within it determines the validity of their democratic choice only up to a point. In fact, full democratic legitimacy and credentials depend on final analysis on a process of external recognition. The outside world judges if the process of regime change can be qualified as having been successful or as having failed. The problem with this is that the only accepted version of successful democracy is a western one. This is exemplified by Schmitter and Karl's work on the essential features of democracy. 25 While highlighting that democracy does not require the same set of institutions across the board, their definition is clearly minimal and coincides with the procedural version. This is not per se negative; it simply confirms that any process of regime change that is attempting to arrive at a democratic society has a very well established internationally sanctioned blueprint.
While not being necessarily a negative development, it is nevertheless problematic. First of all, it pre-empts certain policies or institutional solutions from being adopted thereby restricting the options available to domestic actors when it comes to political, economic, legal and social arrangements. Secondly, there is the problem of cultural adaptation, which is particularly acute in the Muslim world where large Islamic movements tend to be seen as enemies of democracy by definition. 26 This in turn influences external policies towards them and towards the other domestic actors. For instance, if policy-makers cannot conceive of an Islamic democracy, they will be unable to accept a process of transition, which legitimises Islamic parties. Finally, there exists the problem of pigeonholing the new democracies into a pre-conceived role, which serves the dominant actors in the system.
To summarise, it is the contention of this study that international factors play a central role in processes of regime change by affecting the cost and benefit analysis of domestic actors and by restricting the options available to them through the normative value attached to the meaning of democracy, which has a considerable external component. It is also the contention of this paper that these international variables have an impact throughout the whole process of transition and they are not simply limited to one of the phases of it. Through the use of two different dimensions and their interactions, it is possible to have a theoretical framework that can be useful guide to explore specific processes of regime change. In this context, it is useful to emphasise that the structural approaches used so far are not quite satisfactory because they limit the 'definition' of international context and seem to predetermine the outcome of regime change. This is not really the case because of the role of agency. Specific ad hoc policies can radically modify the domestic actors' structure of incentives and therefore an examination of leaders' actions undertaken according to Machiavellian 'situation-bound knowledge' is necessary. 27 A more dynamic model that analyses internal-external linkages is potentially more useful. Also, it is important to re-evaluate the recent notions that the international environment does not operate any longer according to realism.
There are certainly weaknesses in realism), but this should not obscure the fact that much of international politics is still played out according to notions of power, promotion of interests, security guarantees and interferences from centres of power in the affairs of weaker actors. Policies of democracy promotion should be seen in this light.
The next section will analyse the case of the Moroccan transition according to some of the hypotheses that the theoretical framework provide. In order for the framework to be considered useful and having some explanatory power, three tasks
should be fulfilled and evidence should be found for these claims. First of all, the initial decision to open up the political system should be linked to both international structural changes and ad hoc policies implemented by external actors and should not simply be attributed to an autonomous domestic decision. Secondly, there should be evidence that the democratisation process developed with the central contribution of external factors, which changed the incentive structure of the domestic actors playing the game. Finally,
given that the Moroccan transition is ultimately stalled, it should be investigated whether external factors contributed to this or not.
Morocco's stalled democratisation: 1983-2004
Since independence, Morocco has had 'a political system based on authoritarian pluralism.' 28 This should not obscure the fact that the country has been for a long time 'an authoritarian state that kept people in line by intimidation and abuse.' Regarding the origins of the economic crisis, there is agreement that 'the country was severely affected by the recession in the world economy.' 40 The severity of the recession hit Morocco hard, particularly because it came at a time of high external debt.
The recession compounded some of Morocco's structural economic problems, although the Moroccan economy had fared quite well during the 1960s and 1970s. Precisely because the economy had been doing quite well, the impact of the 'external' on the 'internal' is significant. Thus, it can be argued that the international economic crisis had a considerable impact in the collapse of the economy, even if the country was doing well until then. In addition, the role of the worldwide debt crisis seems to confirm the fact that Different conclusions can instead be drawn from the analysis of the period of democratisation that characterised the 1990s and from the failure of consolidation. The hypothesis is that during that time, both structural and actor-led external pressures had a considerable impact on the incentive structure of all domestic actors.
Before proceeding with the analysis it is however important to identify the three main domestic actors involved. The most important one is the King. The other two actors are the so-called democratic parties and the Islamist movements. This differentiation is rather simplistic because it assumes that Islamist groups are not democratic and it is also an instrumental differentiation in the sense that it seems to legitimise anti-democratic behaviour when it is directed at Islamist movements, but it is a common one particularly at policy-making level These three groupings have been affected to varying degrees by the external environment. overwhelmingly from the issues of migration and Islamic revival' 48 and Youngs details these concerns as well. 49 To this, it should be added that economic liberalisation took precedence over democratic political reforms. Thus, even the EU refrained from seriously pressurising the Moroccan government into implementing real democratic changes and and questioned the status quo of the international system. 62 The 1991 Gulf War showed to western countries how little support and credibility they actually enjoyed in the Arab world and made them realise that they were increasingly dependent on authoritarian leaders in the region to maintain the stability necessary to continue extracting benefits.
There is very little doubt that the fear of an Islamist party coming to power through free and fair elections drove policies in the 1990s and well into the new century. Such an attitude towards Islamist movements is not dictated, although it is justified, by a principled policy of defending democracy and human rights. Rather, it is dictated by the necessity to avoid having a party in power that would question the fundamental tenets upon which the current international system is built on. Thus, the provision of political How important are these external factors in stalling democratisation? It is quite difficult to assess the relative importance of the external over the internal because the two cannot be easily separated and measured. However, it is the case that the external environment is not conducive to full democratisation because of the nature of the opposition. Thus, domestic ruling elites and international actors interact in a complex game to support each other to the detriment of electoral democracy.
Conclusion
International factors are an important part of the story of transitions and they should be incorporated in the analysis of such processes. The case of Morocco shows that there are external-internal linkages that need to be examined to understand its stalled democratisation. However, strong causal mechanisms are extremely difficult to prove and this probably explains the prevalent focus on domestic politics and choices. In spite of this, the Moroccan case indicates that weak causal inferences can be made. The theoretical framework proposed emphasises the role of agency over structure and there is evidence to suggest that internal-external linkages determine the path of the transition through interaction.
Regarding Morocco, while the 1983 decision to open up the political system was based on an autonomous domestic decision-making process, the subsequent development of the transition and its failed consolidation are influenced by the external environment.
This is particularly evident when we analyse the nature of the opposition. There is very little doubt that international factors helped the Islamist movement grow even in a country that had been previously thought immune from such phenomenon. 66 Also, there is very little doubt that it is precisely the emergence of such movement that lowered the costs of repression in light of the attitudes of countries and organisations. The costs have been lowered to such an extent that authoritarianism is being rewarded for keeping the Islamist movement out of power. This is done through economic incentives, absence of conditionality, support for weak secular parties, military aid and international legitimacy.
In terms of the literature on democratisation, it emerges that the external intervention to change the cost and benefit analysis of the domestic actors is not always intended to support democracy. At times it is intended to stifle it. In terms of international 
